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 Abstract 
 
A temporary gap is generated by the difference between the Social Value of Mitigation 
Activities (SVMA) and implementable carbon prices. A spectrum of options are available to 
handle this. These options encompass policy instruments that give different weights to 
‘command and control’ measures and to economic incentives. We analyze here how to combine 
an explicit carbon price that rewards mitigation activities every year and a notional price 
embedded in devices that reward low carbon investments beforehand through lowering their 
risk-weighted capital costs.The latter option is essential in order to hedge against two 
uncertainties that adversely affect technologies having high capital costs1.  The first relates to 
technologies which are at the beginning or mid-way of their experience curve. The second 
relates to the net signal launched by explicit carbon prices given the presence of noises that 
swamp it. 
We first illustrate, based on five case studies, the equivalence curves between carbon prices 
and percentages of reduction of capital costs. We argue then that a notional price equated to 
the SVMA can maximize the economic efficiency of financial devices that reduce the capital 
costs of a low carbon project and we discuss the necessity of a world SVMA and of national 
SVMAs. We then introduce uncertainty in the analysis and show that contingent risks 
theoretically need carbon prices to grow to a level well beyond their political acceptability. 
Reducing the risk-weighted capital costs and rewarding upfront low-carbon investments at the 
present value of the SVMA is an efficient way of overcoming these barriers.Finally, we show, in 
the case of India, how to assess a national SVMA that includes the climate benefits and the 
development co-benefits of mitigation activities.  
We then discuss how to articulate a World SVMA (paragraph 108 of the Paris Decision), national 
SVMAs and explicit carbon prices (in line with NDCs) to bridge the funding gap, tackle the 
‘100G$ and +’ issue, and maximize the gains of cooperation around climate policies. 
 
1. Capital costs and switching carbon prices  
 
Hirth and Steckel (2017) clearly establish how lowering the capital costs of low-carbon 
technologies allows for lower switching prices. This can be done through various financial 
devices (subsidies, public guarantees). One problem is to secure their overall efficiency and 
hedge against their potential arbitrariness. Let us examine how a notional price based of an 
SVMA could ensure this. 
For simplicity, the numerical exercises below are based on a World SVMA that translates the 
willingness of the international community to pay for a given climate target. We calculate 
                                                     
1
 La Rovere, E., Hourcade J.C., Priyadarshi S., Espagne E., Perrissin-Fabert B., Social Value of Mitigation Activities and 
forms of Carbon Pricing, Working Paper CIRED n°2017-60 Paris, March 2017 
3 
corridors of this world SVMA from the 900 trajectories of the shadow costs of staying below the 
2°C target. Retaining the maximum likelihood space of these results gives the following ranges: 
[35$/t -60$/t] in 2015, [62$/t – 140 $/t] in 2030, [140$/t – 260 $/t] in 2050 and [980$/t – 2030 
$/t] in 2100. These ranges broadly correspond to optimistic and pessimistic visions of carbon 
saving technical change. 
Let us now assess the present value of these trajectories of SVMA per avoided ton of emission. 
This is exactly the amount of money that should be given upfront to a project which avoids one 
ton of emission, in the absence of explicit carbon prices. With 𝑆𝑉𝐴𝑇 denoting this present value 
and r the discount rate this value is2: 𝑆𝑉𝐴𝑇 = [∑
𝑆𝑉𝑀𝐴𝑡+𝑖
(1+𝑟)𝑖
𝑇−1
𝑖=0 ] /𝑇. Table 1 illustrates the SVAT of 
a standard low carbon project for four different life duration of the equipment and two possible 
discount rates, 5% and 2%. This table confirms that the choice of the discount rate is important: 
the 𝑆𝑉𝐴𝑇 with a 2% discount rate leads to a 1,6 higher upfront support for the 30 years 
projects, 1,86 for 40 years projects, against only 1,18% higher for 10 years projects.  Starting 
from a given carbon value at t0, the present value of SVMAs increases when the discount rate is 
lower than the rate of growth of their nominal value, and decreases when it is higher.  
The left panel of Figure 1 gives, for n pairs of technologies in different contexts, the switching 
prices in favor of the low-carbon technologies corresponding to the level of decrease of their 
capital costs through devices that incorporate the SVATs attached to each project in function of 
the lifetime of the equipment. This is equivalent to giving upfront a percentage of the present 
value of the global SVMA to the project: 64$ and 127$ per ton for ‘Coal+CCS’ projects in France, 
56$ to 115$ per ton and 36$ to 74$ per ton for Hydro projects and firewood projects 
respectively in Brazil and from 36$ to 74$ for solar PV in India.  
If there is an upper bound to the explicit price that can be implemented, this would be an 
efficient way of bridging the carbon price gap. In the ‘French case’ (coal to CCS) a 50$ upper 
bound would be a high enough explicit price with an 8% to 17% guarantee. If we retain a 
20$ upper limit for Brazil a 10% to 20% guarantee would suffice for firewood projects and a 5% 
to 10% for hydro projects. This guarantee should be between 15% to 30% for the solar PV in 
India with a 5$ upper limit (note that the marginal value of income is 20 times higher in India 
than in France). 
These graphs show the risks of ‘overprotection’ since carbon prices are negative beyond a 
certain share of cut in capital costs. This is a strong argument for public guarantee against other 
forms of subsidy. The guarantee is indeed exerted only in case of failure, and will entail no cost 
for public budgets if it concerns all the low-carbon investments.  
 
2. Introducing risks in the analysis 
Let us now introduce uncertainty in the analysis, starting with a simple two-period analysis: in 
the first period, an investor considers the investment costs ‘c’ of a project and, in the second 
period, its commercial benefit ‘b’ plus a reward ‘p’ for the avoidance of one ton of carbon 
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 Assuming that the avoided emissions are evenly distributed over the lifetime of the project. 
 emission. Let us now consider the risks that investment costs will be higher than expected and 
that the risk-adjustedted cost becomes c+ε, where ‘ε’ is the error term that follows a 
probability rule of mean 0 and spread of equally better or worse outcomes. 
In this case, the Net Present Values (NPV) of the project with and without uncertainty are 
identical if the decision-maker is risk neutral: 
𝑵𝑷𝑽 = ∈  [−𝒄 − 𝜺 +
𝒃 + 𝒑
𝟏 + 𝒓
] = −𝒄 +  
𝒃 + 𝒑
𝟏 + 𝒓
 
 
The equivalence between NPVs with and without uncertainty no longer holds, if additional 
expenditures are needed to complete the project, and when the level of deficit of operating 
accounts leads close to a “danger line” that the investor does not want to cross. This is due to 
the asymmetry between a ‘bad surprise’ on future revenues that only makes investment less 
profitable, and a ‘bad surprise on technical costs’. The latter puts indeed the investor at risk of 
losing its cash advance and of seeing its assets recuperated by a bank or another investor.  
Let us denote ‘?̂?’ the maximum investment expenditures beyond which the investor loses his 
cash advance.  
 
Conditional upon ε, the NPV of the project becomes: 
𝑵𝑷𝑽(𝜺) = {
  −𝑐 − 𝜀 +
𝒃
𝟏+𝒓 
     𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛  𝑐 + 𝜀 ≤ ?̂?
  − ?̂?                         𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑐 + 𝜀 > ?̂?
          
 
Its expected NPV is then 
𝐸𝑁𝑃𝑉 = E [−𝑐 − 𝜀 + 
𝑏
1+𝑟
 | 𝜀 <  ?̂? − 𝑐] . P [𝜀 <  ?̂? − 𝑐] − ?̂?. Ρ[ 𝜀 ≥  ?̂? − 𝑐]  
 
For analytical tractability, let us assume that ε is uniformly distributed between −e and e for 
whatever value of c. The decision is simple for low capital cost projects (𝑐 ≤   ?̂? −  𝜀) because it 
is impossible that the costs rise to the limit ?̂?, and for high capital cost projects (𝑐 >   ?̂? +  𝜀) 
because they cannot be below this limit even in case of good surprise. In the intermediary case 
(?̂? − 𝜀 ≤ 𝑐 < ?̂? +  𝜀) the ENPV writes: 
𝐸𝑁𝑃𝑉 = (−𝑐 −
?̂? − 𝑒 − 𝑐
2
+
𝑏
1 + 𝑟
).  
?̂? − 𝑒 − 𝑐
2𝑒
− ?̂?.
𝑐 − ?̂? + 𝑒
2𝑒
 
With the simple probability law selected here, the probability of staying below the danger line 
and of reaping the benefits of the project is  
𝑐̂−𝑒−𝑐
2𝑒
 whereas the probability of overshooting it is 
 
𝑐−𝑐̂+𝑒
2𝑒
. The closer to ?̂? is 𝑐 + 𝑒, the lower the probability of getting a positive revenue and the 
higher the probability of losing ?̂?. Higher revenues are then needed to keep a positive ENPV 
(and thus a higher carbon price). This is pictured in graph 2: the needed carbon price is higher 
than in the certainty case (blue line in the right panel to be compared with the red line in the 
left panel). If instead the SVAT is given ex ante (this is the value s=p/(1+r)), it is the discounted 
value of the red trajectory of carbon prices in the right panel which is below the blue one. 
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Let us now check the orders of magnitude of this very simple mechanism by introducing 
uncertainty in the above case studies. We did so with a ‘weak form’ of treatment of uncertainty, 
without an explicit ‘danger line’ but rather only with the discount rates commonly used in the 
three countries (France, Brazil, India) for long-lived projects perceived as technologically more 
‘risky’. 
In the right panels of Figure 2 we can first observe that the switching carbon prices quickly 
increase compared to the analysis without uncertainty: they move from about 87$ to 150$ for 
the coal with CCS in France, 121$ to 144$ for firewood in Brazil, 27$ to 85$ for hydro in Brazil 
and 10$ to 40$ for the best located sites for PV in India. The difference is far higher for the 
hydro case compared with firewood because it is a more long-lived project. This helps 
appreciating one major source of the ‘funding gap’.  
The benefit of using a SVMA to calibrate public guarantees and cut the risk-weighted capital 
costs appears immediately: depending on whether we assume a high or low SVAT, a 15% to 25% 
guarantee suffices in France in case of a 50$/t limit on carbon prices, a 10% to 20% guarantee in 
India in case of a 5$ explicit price. The two Brazilian cases are interesting because, while a 10% 
to 23% guarantee suffices for the hydro with a 20$ limit on explicit carbon prices, a 40% to 80% 
guarantee is necessary for firewood which confirms the interest of selecting high SVMA to 
promote mitigation action. 
 
 
3. World SVMAs, national SVMAs and explicit carbon 
prices: reaping the benefits of financial cooperation  
 
The World SVMA used for convenience in the above analysis was climate centric and did not 
incorporate the development co-benefits of mitigation actions that are country-specific in 
nature. As developed in the companion (La Rovere et al., 2017) this world SVMA is necessary to 
create mechanisms apt to deliver tangible gains of international financial cooperation around 
climate policies. However, this support is necessarily complementary to each country’s policies. 
Governments should use a national SVMA as well to secure the alignment between climate 
policies and development objectives, to support projects with poor access to international fund, 
and to maximize the leverage effect of international transfers. 
 
These national SVMAs thus encompass the climate and development benefits of mitigation 
activities for a country. To make the difference between the World SVMA and the national 
SVMAs clear, let us use the results of the Indian case study in the Deep Decabonization 
Pathways Project: DDPP (Shukla P;R; etal., 2015) . In a first scenario this study considers policies 
based on a carbon price that starts from 40$ in 2020 to reach 130$ in 2050. In a second 
scenario, India achieves the same level of cumulative emissions reduction between 2020 and 
2050 by aligning its climate policy with its development policy (reduction of air pollution, 
energy security, better urban transport). In this scenario, the needed carbon price is 5$ only in 
 2020 and 105$ in 2050. The difference between the prices in the two scenarios can be 
interpreted as a measure of the minimum co-benefits of avoiding one ton of emissions in a $/t 
metric. Indeed the second scenario is judged politically acceptable whereas the first one is not. 
One can then interpret the carbon price trajectory of the first scenario as the SVMAs of India 
and derive both the SVAT to be used in national financial devices to lower the capital costs of 
mitigation activities.  
Table 2 gives the SVMA for India and the SVATs, the present social value of avoided emissions 
for 10 and 40 years lifetime projects that could be used to calibrate (for example) public 
guarantees by the Indian government. Interestingly, these SVATs are lower than the World 
SVATs in Table 1 and decrease more sharply with the lifetime of the projects. This reflects the 
fact that, even with the inclusion of their co-benefits, mitigation actions do not generate co-
benefits for a large range of development priorities in India. A country prioritizing the reduction 
of poverty necessarily adopts higher discount rates than a developed country. An articulation 
between the World SVMA and national SVMAs seems necessary here to close this gap. As in the 
national examples above, it is also possible to anchor financial devices triggering international 
financial transfers which cannot be reached by other means and that will exert a leverage effect 
on countries’ public policies. 
This will help countries to reinforce their NDCs and create the enabling conditions for higher 
explicit carbon prices. Interestingly, the Indian case shows how the gap between the SVMA and 
the explicit carbon price will be progressively bridged (from one to seven in 2020 to one to 
three in 2050 in the Indian case). 
 
4. Overall Conclusions 
 
Pricing the full Social Value of Mitigation Actions can be made through explicit carbon prices, or 
by notional prices incorporated in devices cutting down the capital costs of low-carbon 
investments. These notional prices can support strong immediate action even in the presence of 
low initial corridors of prices. 
Two levels of SVMAs are to be considered: country-specific SVMAs which translate the 
assessment by each country of the development co-benefits of mitigation activities and a world 
SVMA which translates the willingness of the world community to reach the 2°C target. Their 
articulation is needed to foster financial cooperation and accelerate the adoption of low carbon 
projects by lowering their risk-weighted capital costs. 
Because climate policies evolve through a sequential process, we do not need to adopt 
corridors of SVMAs and prices up to the end of the century.  SVMAs can be updated periodically 
based on the evidence of the effectiveness of climate policies in accelerating technical progress 
of low-carbon techniques.  
One overarching conclusion is that the switching price of carbon is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition to set the explicit price of carbon in a country since it can be null with a sufficient level 
of public guarantee. Actually, explicit carbon pricing is necessary to a) raise revenues to mitigate 
the adverse impacts of higher energy costs; b) control of the rebound effects of demand after 
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gains in energy efficiency; and c) send an all pervading signal for the myriad of decision-makers 
which escape rule-based policies and cannot be covered by specific financial devices.  
 
TABLE 1  𝑺𝑽𝑨𝑻  ($/t) for projects of different duration  
 
 
TABLE 2:  notional SVATs ($/t at 2% discount rate), their present value and carbon 
prices in India 
 
Note: figures in italics show how the present value of SVMA evolves for projects starting at 
various points in time (only for informative purposes) 
 
 
GRAPHE 2   Carbon price paid upfront vs along the project life time 
M Technological optimism path Technological pessimism path 
                Discount rate 5% 2% 5% 2% 
T=10 73,50 87,25 36,66 43,24 
T=20 75,76 104,71 36,54 50,20 
T=30 72,26 115,34 35,56  56,96 
T=40 68,82 127,50 34,34 64,22 
 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Indian SVMA 20 50 70 105 
Explicit carbon prices 3 10 18 30 
𝑆𝑉𝐴𝑇10̂  25,51 
 
46,76 
 
67,98 
 
81,08 
 
𝑆𝑉𝐴𝑇40̂  19,96 
 
29,76 
 
37,08 
 
40,35 
 
 
 
 
 GRAPHE 3 Switching carbon prices and lowering capital costs using a SVMA 
 
Coal – CCS (France) 
 
 
Firewood (Brazil) 
 
 
 
Hydro (Brazil) 
 
 
Solar (India) 
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